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The before-before experiment demonstrates that quantum randomness can be controlled by
influences from outside spacetime, and therefore by immaterial free will. Rather than looking at
quantum physics as the model for explaining free will, one should look at free will as a primitive
principle for explaining why the laws of Nature are quantum.
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I. THE AMBIGUITY OF THE TERM
’RANDOMNESS’
The assumption that human behavior is not completely
determined by the past plays a key role in the way we
behave in daily life and organize society through law.
When I typewrite this article, I assume that I am gov-
erning the movements of my fingers through my free will.
Accordingly I claim to be the author of the article and to
express original thoughts, which are not completely pre-
determined at the beginning of the Universe. Anyone
who claims for the right “to choose how to live his life”
should coherently exclude any explanation of his brain
using only deterministic causality, be it in terms of genes,
chemicals or environmental influences.
In this sense, the principle of freedom conflicts with
the deterministic description of classical physics. The
philosopher Immanuel Kant vividly experienced this con-
flict in his own intellectual life, and declared: “it can-
not be alleged that, instead of the laws of nature, laws
of freedom may be introduced into the causality of the
course of nature. For, if freedom were determined accord-
ing to laws, it would be no longer freedom, but merely
nature.”[1] This conclusion was inescapable within the
deterministic science of Kant’s time.
By contrast today’s quantum physics assumes events
which are not completely determined by the past, and
cannot be explained by means of observable causes alone.
In this sense this theory offers a description of the world
which does not exclude free-willed agency in principle.
Suppose the quantum experiment sketched in Figure 1.
When one works with sufficiently weak intensity of light,
then only one of the two detectors clicks: either D(+) or
D(−) (photoelectric effect). Nevertheless, for calculating
the counting rates of each detector one must take into
account information about the two paths leading from
the laser source to the detector: The probability that
one detector clicks in a large series of runs can be exactly
predicted for each detector, and depends deterministi-
cally on the path-length difference (interference effect).
According to quantum mechanics, which detector clicks
in a single run in the experiment of Figure 1 is decided by
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FIG. 1: Single particle interference is the entry to the Quan-
tum World. Laser light of frequency ω emitted by the source
is either transmitted or reflected at each of the beam-splitters
(half-silvered mirrors) BS1 and BS2; therefore the light can
reach the detectors D(+) and D(−) by the paths l and s; the
path-length l can be changed by the experimenter. With suf-
ficiently weak intensity of light, only one of the two detectors
clicks: either D(+) or D(−) (photoelectric effect). Never-
theless, Nature calculates the counting rates of each detector
Pr(+) and Pr(−) taking account of the length of the two paths
l and s (interference effect). According to quantum mechan-
ics, which detector clicks in a single run is decided by a true
choice (on the part of Nature) when the information about
the two paths reaches the detectors: There is nothing in the
universe allowing us to predict which alternative will happen.
a true choice (on the part of Nature) when the informa-
tion about the two paths reaches the detectors. Which
detector clicks is not only unpredictable for us because
we don’t yet know the formula connecting the past with
the present and the present with the future, but it is un-
predictable in principle because such a formula doesn’t
exist at all.
The event that D(+) clicks and D(−) does not click is
often said to be “a genuinely random event” [2]. ’Ran-
dom’ means here that Nature’s decision about which de-
tector clicks, though it has some roots in the past, is not
completely determined by the past.
A frequent objection against the possible relevance of
quantum physics for the question of free will is that quan-
tum non-deterministic randomness excludes the possibil-
ity of order and control, and therefore free will. Thus
2one states for instance that: “In the end, however, it is
clear that neither determinism nor randomness is good
for free will. If nature is fundamentally random, then
outcomes of our actions are also completely beyond our
control: randomness is just as bad as determinism”[2].
Here the term ’randomness’ refers to ’exclusion of order
and control’, and not ’not completely determined by the
past’.
This paper aims to show that quantum physics does
not entail the presumed incompatibility of quantum ran-
domness with order and control. Section II argues on
the basis of the before-before experiment that quantum
randomness can be controlled by unobservable influences
from outside spacetime and, therefore, is compatible with
freedom in principle: Both quantum randomness and free
will, refer to agency which is not exclusively determined
by the past. Section III answers a number of other objec-
tions. Section IV concludes by stating that one should
look at free will as a primitive principle for explaining
why the laws of Nature are quantum, instead of looking
at the quantum as the model for explaining free will.
II. QUANTUM RANDOMNESS CAN BE
CONTROLLED BY UNOBSERVABLE
INFLUENCES FROM OUTSIDE SPACETIME
Quantum mechanics predicts correlated outcomes in
space-like separated regions for experiments using 2-
particle entangled states like the represented in Figure
2. Suppose one of the measurements produces the value
a (a ∈ {+,−}), and the other the value b (b ∈ {+,−}).
According to quantummechanics the probability Pr(a, b)
of getting the joint outcome (a, b) depends on the choice
of the phase parameters characterizing the paths or chan-
nels uniting the source and the detectors; depending on
the value of the phases, the quantity Pr(a, b) oscillates
between the situation of perfect correlation Pr(a = b) =
1, and that of perfect anticorrelation Pr(a = b) = 0.
However, Pr(a) for photon 1 alone is 50%, and Pr(b) for
photon 2 alone is 50% too.
There are two alternative ways of explaining these
quantum correlations, depending on whether one as-
sumes the freedom of the experimenter as an axiom or
not. In the context of the experiment illustrated in Fig-
ure 2, this axiom states that in choosing the values of
the path-lengths l the physicists are not completely de-
termined by the past.
I would like to insist that the “freedom of the experi-
menter” is not something one can settle by experiment or
computing, but is a matter of principle: you can either
choose or reject it.
If you reject it, then you can explain things in a entirely
(local or nonlocal) deterministic way:
You can for instance assume like Gerard ’t Hooft sort of
local “super-deterministic” conspiracy in Nature: Things
are so contrived that the physicist unconsciously set path-
lengths (Figure 2) which fit to the properties the particles
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FIG. 2: In entanglement experiments, local random events
can be influenced from outside spacetime to produce nonlocal
patterns (correlations). The source emits photon pairs. Pho-
ton 1 (frequency ω1) enters the left interferometer through
the beam-splitter BS10 and gets detected after leaving the
beam-splitter BS11, and photon 2 (frequency ω2) enters the
right interferometer through the beam-splitter BS20 and gets
detected after leaving the beam-splitter BS21. The detectors
are denoted D1(a) and D2(b) (a, b ∈ {+,−}). Each interfer-
ometer consists in a long arm of length li, and a short one of
length si, i ∈ {1, 2}. Frequency bandwidths and path align-
ments are chosen so that only the coincidence detections cor-
responding to the path pairs: (s1, s2) and (l1, l2) contribute
constructively to the correlations, where (s1, s2) denotes the
pair of the two short arms, and (l1, l2) the pair of the two
long arms. Depending on the value of the phase Φ, the quan-
tity Pr(a, b) oscillates between the situation of perfect cor-
relation Pr(a = b) = 1, and that of perfect anticorrelation
Pr(a = b) = 0. However, Pr(a) for photon 1 alone is al-
ways 50%, and Pr(b) for photon 2 alone is 50% too. Bell
experiments, using two different values of l1 and two different
values of l2, demonstrate that the correlations violate the lo-
cality criteria (Bell’s inequalities). The before-before experi-
ment demonstrates that nonlocal correlations have their roots
outside of space-time. In this experiment the beam-splitters
BS11 and BS21 are in motion in such a way that each of them,
in its own reference frame, is first to select the output of the
photons (before-before timing). Then, each outcome should
become independent of the other, and the nonlocal correla-
tions should disappear. The result was that the correlations
doesn’t disappear, and therefore are independent of any time-
order.
carry in order to produce the correlations [9].
Or you can choose the “Many Worlds” picture, which
also is fully local deterministic [2, 3]: Everything that can
happen does in fact happen, but in different worlds, and
thus, actually, there is no violation of Bell inequalities.
This violation originates from the feeling that you are
’someone’ living in a particular world. But this feeling is
an illusion, because you cannot know “which ’you’ is you,
and which ’you’ is a copy”. It is a merit of this picture
3to show that determinism implies the loss of personal
identity.
Or finally you can assume a picture in the sense of
David Bohm [10], invoking influences which are both
faster than light (nonlocal) and deterministic. How-
ever in this case determinism is rather fictitious because
the time one assumes does not correspond to any real
clock [7]. Moreover, by choosing “Super-determinism”
or “Many Worlds” you get rid of the spooky nonlocality
for the same price.
If you accept the axiom of freedom on the part of the
experimenter, then you are necessarily led to accept non-
local influences between the apparatuses on both parts
of the setup of Figure 2, i.e., influences which cannot be
explained by signals traveling with v ≤ c, as Bell exper-
iments show [3, 4]. Moreover, the before-before experi-
ment [5] rules out the belief that physical causality nec-
essarily is time ordered, so that an observable event (the
effect) always originates from another observable event
(the cause) occurring before in time. This experiment
demonstrates that the nonlocal correlations have their
roots outside of spacetime [6].
Additionally, in quantum entanglement experiments
(Figure 2) local randomness and nonlocal order appear
inseparably united: A random event event A is nonlocally
correlated according to statistical rules to another ran-
dom event B. This means that non pre-determined (“gen-
uinely random”) local events can be controlled to gener-
ate nonlocal patterns (correlations) and, as the before-
before experiment shows, the control happens from out-
side spacetime. The quantum correlations do not result
automatically from the real properties the particles carry
and the real settings they meet: they cannot be explained
by any history in the spacetime [6, 8]. In other words, the
quantum correlations require decisions that take place
when measurement happens, and establish ordered out-
comes.
The before-before experiment supports David Hume’s
view that causation in time is an illusion of our intuition.
The true causes are invisible and act from outside space-
time. We know these causes through the visible effects
which they produce –the nonlocal correlations.
The result that immaterial agency controls quantum
randomness to produce correlations (order), can open the
road towards an explanation of how a mind may purpose-
fully generate more sophisticated pieces of information.
Consider the interference experiment of Figure 3. A sin-
gle outcome, either ’+’ or ’−’, represent a bit of informa-
tion, and a series of outcomes (a bit string) build a piece
of information. Quantum physics requires that long se-
ries of outcomes fulfill a statistical distribution imposed
mainly by the parameter of the path-length difference.
Quantum physics imposes nothing regarding the order in
which the single outcomes occur, and does not establish
how long a series must be, to be considered “long”.
Thus, it is possible in principle that an unobservable
mental variable (a free-willed intellect) influences pur-
posefully the order of the bits during a time, and encodes
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FIG. 3: In quantum interference, a single outcome, either ’+’
or ’−’, represent a bit of information, and a large series of out-
comes builds a string of bits 1 and 0, a piece of information.
The path-length difference determines the statistical distribu-
tion of the outcomes for large series, say for instance: 53% ’1’
and 47% ’0’. Quantum physics imposes nothing regarding the
order in which the single outcomes occur, provide the statis-
tical distribution is fulfilled for a “long” series of bits. It is
possible in principle that an unobservable mental variable (a
free willed intellect) influences the order of the bits during a
time, and encodes a message in the string.
a message in the string. In any case, further purposeless
outcomes would restore the outcomes’ distribution the
parameter impose.
This means that quantum indeterminism can be used
purposefully, in accord with Anton Zeilinger’s view of
the “two freedoms”: there is the freedom on the part of
Nature, additionally to the freedom on the part of the
experimenter [11].
As said in Section I, the postulate of free-will or choice
on the part of Nature was tacitly assumed in the picture
of the “collapse of the wave function” in experiments like
that of Figure 1. Nevertheless only after the before-before
experiment the choice on the part of Nature can be con-
sidered demonstrated.
John Conway and Simon Kochen state: “If indeed
there exist any experimenters with a modicum of free
will, then elementary particles must have their own share
of this valuable commodity.”[13] I think that on the ba-
sis of the before-before experiment one can conclude more
precisely: If I claim to be free, then I have also to accept
that there is free will controlling the outcomes in quan-
tum experiments. Not that the “particles” are free, but
the mind deciding (from outside the spacetime) which
detector clicks.
If by ’random’ one means events that are not com-
pletely determined by the past, one can very well con-
sider that quantum randomness and free will have the
same origin. Your free will is for me as unpredictable as
the best random number generator. One can interpret
the before-before experiment in terms of “nonlocal ran-
domness” or “nonlocal free-will” as well. Nicolas Gisin
states: “the same randomness manifests itself at several
locations” [12]). I state: “a mind influences local ran-
domness from outside spacetime to produce nonlocal or-
der.” I think the two statements are equivalent.
4III. OBJECTIONS
In the preceding Section I have stressed that determin-
ism excludes free will, whereas quantum physics allows
us to describe a world where freedom is possible. I now
answer several objections against this view.
1. Were all those who believed in free will before the arrival
of quantum physics making an irrational assessment?
As referred to above in Section I, the philosopher Kant
was fully aware of the contradiction between freedom and
deterministic science.
In the past, supporters of the deterministic view of sci-
ence who believed in free will, were certainly making a
self-contradictory assessment though they may have over-
looked it. Today, the powerful and successful search for
neural correlates of human cognition and behavior does
not longer permit to hide the deterministic threat, and
Kant’s dilemma is becoming especially acute. Some years
ago the German neuroscientist Wolf Singer reformulated
the dilemma as follows: “We experience ourselves as free
mental beings, but the scientific view does not admit any
room for a mental agent like the free will, which influences
neurons and produces actions [...] In my eyes this conflict
cannot be solved for the time being. Both descriptions
can be shared together even by researchers of the brain:
when I observe the brain I cannot find any evidence of a
mental agent like the free will or the own responsibility
–nevertheless when I get home in the evening I hold my
children responsible for their actions if they have done
any nonsense.”[14]
Like Singer, most of those who claim that classical
neural-network computations are entirely sufficient to
deal with the problems encountered by nervous systems
[18], definitely declare that they are “for freedom”. One
may try to solve the incompatibility between freedom and
deterministic neuroscience by claiming that freedom is
“a moral or philosophical issue”. Nevertheless, as Singer
suggests, this explanation is not satisfactory. Indeed, sci-
ence tries to explain the brain, and the wish for freedom
undoubtedly happens in the brain [17]: if the brain pro-
cesses are actually completely determined by the past, it
is not clear how they can produce such a wish, i.e. the
wish for “not being completely determined by the past”.
Placed in front of the conflict between freedom and de-
terministic neuroscience two rational positions are possi-
ble: Either you claim that freedom is an illusion. Or you
consider that deterministic neuroscience is not the last
word about the brain and has to be superseded by a neu-
roscience admitting processes which are not completely
determined by the past.
Singer himself seems now more open to this second
possibility, and uses to begin his talks with the warning:
“Let us be careful. Perhaps there are in the world still
things that, if we discover them, will turn the world inside
out like quantum physics did with classical physics.”[15]
I think these words point to the right direction: In any
case, we cannot solve the problem with a description on
the basis of classical physics. A number of neuroscien-
tist considers that quantum mechanics is not appropriate
either, and say that we need a “new physics” to under-
stand “exotic” brain states like mind and consciousness,
“a physics that does not yet exists, but obviously does
not violate the current laws of Nature.” [17]
Even agreeing that quantum physics must be com-
pleted in a number of points, I consider that the skep-
ticism about the compatibility of quantum physics with
free will originates from misunderstandings: As argued
above, the free will of the experimenter is not a theo-
rem deriving from the quantum, but an axiom one can
freely accept or reject. If one assumes the axiom, then
the before-before experiment demonstrates that quantum
randomness can be controlled by immaterial free will. As
soon as these consequences are understood I am confident
that the skepticism will disappear: Quantum physics pro-
vides a balanced mixture of deterministic statistical rules
and non-deterministic single events to account for a world
where freedom is possible.
2. In the lab we do not meet quantum devices printing out
poems, scientific papers, or any meaningful message.
Such a possibility is not forbidden at all by quantum
physics, provided statistical rules for “long” series of out-
comes are not violated. Accordingly, I think that in daily
life we meet plenty of “quantum devices” (human brains)
communicating efficiently with each other.
Many features of my brain’s physiology are suscepti-
ble to deterministic description in terms of observable
causal chains (the metabolism involved in the arousal
potentials triggering bodily movements, for instance, fol-
lows the usual physical conservation laws). Additionally,
the physiological measurable parameters of the brain are
fixed by a number of factors (genetic, epigenetic and en-
vironmental ones), and in particular by sensorial impres-
sions. These parameters determine the statistical distri-
bution of the brain outcomes for large series at a given
time. During certain periods of time a brain produces
meaningful pieces of information (speech, text, musical
composition, painting...). During other periods of time
(while sleeping and even during many wake periods) the
brain produces incoherent random signals.
The choices guiding my spontaneous movements, for
instance typing a particular key (’r’, ’a’, ’d’, ’o’, etc.)
while writing this paper, they originate from unobserv-
able mental agency influencing the basic random dynam-
ics of my brain.
The “unobservable mental variable” I introduce does
not imply probabilities beyond the quantum ones, nor in-
validates any law of Nature. The quantum philosophical
view I propose overcomes the dualistic view of the soul
“as something divorced from the tangible grey matter”.
53. “Why should an autonomous and self-conscious mind,
directly created by God, need a brain to live and act in the
material world?” [17]
This objection overlooks an essential characteristic of
human nature. Besides the impossibility of signaling
faster than light (“no signaling”), there is another funda-
mental limitation defining the human condition: the im-
possibility of being in a permanent conscious state. The
human mind cannot be permanently aware of his own
existence, the human will cannot act on purpose all the
time. A human person is not a pure spiritual intellect
(an angel), but a neuronal one, i.e. a mind who cannot
be permanently self-conscious. A human brain is noth-
ing other than the ensemble of conditions which make
it possible that such a mind exists, basically through a
sleep-wake cycle.
A brain is a device combining meaningless spontaneous
outcomes and purposefully ordered ones, and a possibil-
ity to achieving this could come from the following rule:
At any moment a large series of brain outcomes must
obey a statistical distribution deriving from the values
of physiological parameters at this moment. Suppose
that by producing wilful and meaningful pieces of infor-
mation (short series of bits), the statistical distribution
of the brain outcomes differs to some extent from the
expected one. According to the rule such a statistical
deviation needs to be balanced by other periods (sleep,
uncontrolled movements) restoring the large scale distri-
bution.
I call this possibility the Quantum Homeostasis Hy-
pothesis. In particular, REM (Rapid Eye Movements)
sleep may be important not only to the developing of the
infants brain, but also to the homeostatic regulation of
quantum distributions in each phase of life. REM de-
notes paradoxical stages of sleep, in which the brain is
highly active [19]. REM sleep, and especially “phasic
REM” [20], may be part of the price we have to pay for
the periods of intentional behavior and alertness during
normal waking.
The Quantum Homeostasis Hypothesis for the func-
tionality of REM sleep is somewhat complementary
to the Synaptic Homeostasis Hypothesis for non-REM
stages, which states that during sleep, the synapses
weaken. This weakening restores the brain for the next
period of learning: “Sleep is the price we have to pay for
plasticity, and its goal is the homeostatic regulation of
the total synaptic weight impinging on neurons” [21].
In this perspective, no permanent conscious state, sim-
ilar to no signaling faster than light, may provide a prim-
itive principle for explaining why the laws of Nature are
quantum.
My capacity for alertness is limited: I cannot keep driv-
ing a car indefinitely without sleeping; after a time I will
begin to have random neuron firings, eventually halluci-
nate, and finally fall asleep at the wheel. Sleep may indi-
cate when a series of signals from the brain-stem is “large
enough” and must inescapably obey a statistical law im-
posed by physiological parameters. If so, this would be
important information to complete quantum physics.
In any case, the Quantum Homeostasis Hypothesis ac-
counts well for: (a) the relevant fact that we experience
ourselves as mental free beings capable of producing pur-
posefully brain outcomes as speaking and acting, and (b)
the available observations on REM sleep [22]. An impor-
tant open question is why sleep proceeds in several cycles
of alternating non-REM and REM stages, and why REM
sleep itself exhibits cycles of tonic and phasic REM [20].
4. Consciousness, thinking, deciding are brain processes
involving billions of neurons, i.e., macroscopic physical
states, and therefore far away from quantum states [17].
In the same line of thinking one states: “Molecular
machines, such as the light-amplifying components of
photoreceptors, pre- and post-synaptic receptors and the
voltage- and ligand-gated channel proteins that span cel-
lular membranes and underpin neuronal excitability, are
so large that they can be treated as classical objects.
Although brains obey quantum mechanics, they do not
seem to exploit any of its special features.”[18]
The objection originates from a widespread prejudice
about the quantum. It overlooks that the decision about
which detector clicks (in an interference experiment, Fig-
ure 1) does not happen when “one photon encounters a
detector” but only subsequently, after a virtual cascade
involving billions of electrons has been triggered. Only
then an irreversible registration of a result happens and
a human observer can become aware of it. In fact this
means that the decision is not between “one photon en-
countering D(+)” and “one photon encountering D(−)”,
but between “a virtual assembly of electrons in D(+)”
and “a virtual assembly of electrons in D(−)”. The deci-
sion gives reality to one of these two virtual assemblies of
electrons: A detection is an “elementary act of creation”,
in Anton Zeilinger’s words.
The particular conditions defining when precisely the
decision happens are to date an unsolved (but solvable)
problem (the measurement problem -see Objection 7 be-
low). By contrast, as said above, the question of which
detector clicks is a matter of an unobservable free deci-
sion, and as such cannot be answered. All this means
that “quantum effects” (already at the level of simple in-
terference experiments) consist in decisions about macro-
scopic outcomes occurring in visible classical objects (de-
tectors).
Let us now consider a conscious decision about for
instance moving the right or left hand. We know that
this depends on the building of different “transient neu-
ronal assemblies” [23]. The neuronal assemblies (like the
counts in different detectors in quantum experiments) are
measurable. But the choice between two rival neuronal
assemblies, as the choice between two rival detectors, may
very well originate from unobservable agency.
You can say that the difficulty in tackling this issue by
6experimental means is only due to the high inaccuracy
of current measuring techniques: imaging techniques for
instance are still too slow to capture the recruitment of
ten million cells in less than a quarter of a second.
This was the kind of objection raised against indeter-
minism in the beginnings of quantum mechanics. The
techniques for studying the neuronal activity will cer-
tainly improve, but not to the extreme of overcoming
any indeterminacy. Just like information technology will
not improve to the extreme of communicating faster than
light.
If you assume that basically “brains obey quantum me-
chanics”, and you are for freedom, then the reasonable
attitude is to conclude that the realization of one specific
neuronal assembly among several possible ones cannot
be explained exclusively through deterministic causality.
As in the case of the detectors in the interference ex-
periments, there is nothing in the observable universe,
no story in the spacetime, capable of explain why this
neuronal assembly happens and not another.
5. There is no need for a metaphysical principle beyond the
neurophysiological activity: Mind and consciousness can be
considered physical states. [17]
In the same direction Wolf Singer compares the brain
to “an orchestra without conductor”: The brain is a
highly complex system with nonlinear dynamics, and
therefore capable of self-organization; the concept of a
“Self” sharing immaterial operations is an illusion [16].
Singer’s argument is rooted in a fallacy that comes
from the intuitive way of thinking about causality. Intu-
ition leads us to conceive time as the basis of causality
and order. If we observe order and synchronization and
cannot explain them by measurable causes in spacetime,
we may intuitively be tempted to conclude that there is
no cause at all, that “No One” acts through the brain.
The argument has the merit of showing again that deter-
minism leads to the loss of the personal identity.
If one assumes the freedom of the scientist as an ax-
iom, then “self-organization” cannot be considered deter-
ministic. Non-deterministic self-organization in a highly
complex system like the brain can very well result from
quantum effects amplified through nonlinear chaotic dy-
namics.
It is well known that quantum physics supports “ex-
perimental metaphysics”: Nothing speaks against consid-
ering mind and consciousness quantum-mechanical states
of the brain. Actually, “self-organization” is another way
of saying that random neural dynamics is controlled from
outside spacetime by unobservable principles like free will
and consciousness: “Self-organization” of the brain is
synonymous to “organization by the Self”.
6. Specific molecular machines and proteins have been
proposed to implement quantum computations. However
quantum computations are difficult to implement, and the
brain does not seem to offer the conditions required to avoid
decoherence [18].
Quantum computations are difficult to implement with
a machine susceptible to utilization by any external tech-
nician. This requires very strong constraints to avoid de-
coherence. The brain is not such a machine: I can influ-
ence the randomness in my brain, but I cannot influence
the randomness in your brain.
The efficacy of free will originates from influencing the
order of the bits in a string of brain outcomes from out-
side spacetime, without violating the statistical distribu-
tion for a large series. This cannot be done by chang-
ing material variables, the same as in the experiment
sketched in Figure 3 the order of the outcomes cannot be
controlled by changing path-lengths.
7. There is no evidence that consciousness is strictly
necessary to the collapse of the wave function [18].
In fact, for measurement to happen it is not neces-
sary at all that a human observer (conscious or not) is
watching the apparatuses. However the very definition
of measurement makes relation to human consciousness:
An event is “measured”, i.e. irreversibly registered, only
if it is possible for a human observer to become aware of
it.
The concept of irreversibility appears explicitly in the
clinical definition of death, which basically states that
death occurs when the neural functions responsible for
certain spontaneous movements irreversibly break down.
In establishing death this way, we are assuming as ob-
vious that our capacity of restoring neuronal dynamics
(our repairing capability) is limited in principle, even if
we don’t yet know where this limitation comes from.
Similarly, one could assume that amplification in a
photomultiplier becomes irreversible in principle at a cer-
tain level, if beyond this level an operation exceeding the
human capabilities would be required to restore the pho-
ton’s quantum state. When such a level is reached the
detector clicks. Such a view combines the subjective and
the objective interpretation of measurement: on the one
hand no human observer has to be actually present in
order that a registration takes place, just the same as in
the GRW “spontaneous collapse” [24, 25]) or Penrose’s
“objective reduction” (OR) [26]; on the other hand one
defines the ’collapse’ or ’reduction’ with relation to the
capabilities of the human observer [27].
Measurement is basic to quantum mechanics. But the
theory does not define at all which conditions deter-
mine when measurement happens (measurement prob-
lem). This state of affairs clearly shows another point
where the theory can and must be completed.
7IV. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion has highlighted that free will
is an axiom one can accept, or reject. The way scientists
themselves behave overwhelmingly confirms the great ac-
ceptance of the axiom of free will: Any scientist will claim
to be the conscious and free author of the work he pub-
lishes, and not a zombie repeating things already pre-
determined in the Big-Bang. The scientist is part of the
world. If he chooses to be free, then there is free will in
the world.
Free will, though not permanently conscious, is a prim-
itive principle that implies a world sharing quantum fea-
tures:
If you choose freedom, then you must coherently reject
any pure deterministic explanation of the world and in
particular of the human brain and body.
The before-before experiment demonstrates that im-
material influences can control randomness to produce
nonlocal patterns. Thus, immaterial free will can control
the random dynamics of the brain to produce meaning-
ful communication and behavior, but has to pay for it
with uncontrolled dynamics during sleep (no permanent
conscious state). This constraint can also be formulated
by stating that brain outcomes have to fulfil distribu-
tions imposed by neurophysiological parameters: statis-
tical deviations after a certain amount of control (while
waking) are corrected by further uncontrolled outcomes
(while sleeping). Free will fits well with statistical laws
of Nature like the quantum mechanical ones.
Conversely, if you choose a completely deterministic
description of the brain, then you should coherently give
up freedom and responsibility. You cannot even claim to
be ’Someone’ because determination by the past implies
the loss of personal identity.
If you (like Wolf Singer) have a problem with these con-
sequences, this may mean that you are not satisfied with
your deterministic option, and you are actually wonder-
ing why a deterministic shaped universe produces guys
like you and me who wish to be free.
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